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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This article uses Herbert Wechsler’s 1959 Neutral Principles 
address at Harvard as a lens through which to re-conceptualize the 
legal history of civil rights.  Derided for criticizing Brown v. Board 
of Education in 1959, Wechsler first became involved in civil 
rights reform in the 1930s, continued to be interested in civil rights 
issues in the 1940s, and argued one of the most important civil 
rights cases of the 1960s.  His critique of Brown in Neutral 
Principles this article maintains, derived not from a disinterest in 
the black struggle but from a larger conviction that racial reform 
should be process rather than rights-based.  By recovering 
Wechsler’s approach, this article suggests a new paradigm for 
understanding the Supreme Court’s role in the civil rights 
movement, one that focuses on process-based rulings like New 
York Times v. Sullivan, not Brown. 
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“NEUTRAL” PRINCIPLES: 
RETHINKING THE LEGAL HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 
1934-1964 
 
 
ANDERS WALKER*
 
 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
“[T]he question posed by state-enforced segregation is not 
one of discrimination at all.”1 So proclaimed Columbia law 
professor Herbert Wechsler to a surprised audience at Harvard 
Law School in April 1959.  Hardly a southern segregationist, 
Wechsler’s words suggested a shocking indifference to the plight 
of African Americans in the South, not to mention a puzzling 
rejection of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education.2   “I find it hard to think,” Wechsler 
exclaimed, “that [Brown] really turned upon the facts.”3  
“Suppose,” he posited, “that more Negroes in a community 
preferred separation than opposed it?”4  What if, he pondered even 
more bizarrely, blacks were “hurt” by integration?5
Wechsler’s doubts about integration, and the fact that he 
chose to express them just as massive resistance to Brown was 
entering a decline, have puzzled scholars for almost five decades.6  
                                                 
* Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law, Yale University 
Ph.D. 2003, Duke University J.D./M.A. 1998, Wesleyan University, B.A. 1994.  
I would like to thank Michael Klarman and Risa Goluboff for comments, 
criticism, and corrections.  I would also like to thank Eric Miller, Fred Bloom, 
the History Department at San Francisco State University, the American Society 
for Legal History and the Midwest Regional Junior Scholars Workshop at 
Washington University School of Law.  Further credit goes to the Oral History 
Research Office at Columbia University for allowing me to Xerox the full 362 
page transcript of Geoffrey Miller and Norman Silber’s oral interviews with 
Herbert Wechsler, and Kathleen Casey at Saint Louis University School of Law 
for tracking down an unpublished Senate Hearing delving into Wechsler’s ties to 
the National Lawyers’ Guild and the International Labor Defense in the 1930s. 
1 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 34 (1959) [hereinafter Wechsler, Principles].  
2 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
3 Wechsler, Principles, supra note 1, at 33.   
4 Id. 
5 Id.   
6 For scholars who reacted negatively to Wechsler, Neutral Principles, see 
Charles L. Black, Jr. The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L. 
J. 421 (1960); Ira Michael Heyman, The Chief Justice, Racial Segregation, and 
the Friendly Critics, 49 CAL. L. REV. 104 (1961); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
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Yet, they formed the basis of one of the most important law review 
articles of the twentieth century.7  “Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law,” an expanded version of Wechsler’s 1959 
Harvard address, gained instant notoriety for blasting the Warren 
Court’s “ad hoc” jurisprudence, meanwhile establishing firm 
guidelines for how the Supreme Court should practice judicial 
review.8  Even in cases where petitioners may be sympathetic, 
argued Wechsler, the Court should rely on “neutral principles” that 
“transcended” immediate parties’ interests.9
While critics have derided Wechsler for endorsing a rigid 
reliance on “neutrality” at the expense of racial justice; a close 
look at historical events both preceding and following his 1959 
speech suggests a remarkably different thesis: Wechsler advocated 
legal neutrality not to thwart racial justice, but to achieve it.  As 
this article will illustrate, Wechsler called for a federal 
“reconstruction” of the South as early as 1934, long before the 
Warren Court decided Brown.10  Further, he endorsed federal anti-
lynching legislation from 1934 to 1938, and personally salvaged 
the defense of black communist Angelo Herndon against charges 
of inciting insurrection in Georgia from 1935 to 1937.11
During his engagement with Herndon’s case, which went to 
the Supreme Court twice, Wechsler came to realize that couching 
claims in neutral terms might have strategic value for black clients.  
After suffering a procedural defeat before the Supreme Court in 
                                                                                                                                                 
ORTHODOXY 265-8 (1992); Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of 
Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, U. CHI. L. REV. 661 (1960); Richard 
Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory – And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L. J. 
223 (1981); Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950s, 21 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 
561 (1988); Louis H. Pollak, Jr., Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A 
Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959); Martin Shapiro, The 
Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and Neutral 
Principles, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587 (1963); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the 
Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).  For the decline of massive resistance in 1959, see 
NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN 
THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950S 320-339 (2d ed. 1997). 
7 Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles: A Retrospective, 50 VAND. L. REV. 503 
(1997); Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 
COL. L. REV. 982 (1978); Fred Shapiro, The Most Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUDIES 409 (2000); Fred Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles 
Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in 
Constitutional Law, 92 COL. L. REV. 1 (1992).  
8 See sources cited supra note 7; Wechsler, Principles, supra note 1, at 15.  
9 Wechsler, Principles, supra note 1, at 17, 19.  
10 Herbert Wechsler, Review of James Chadbourn’s Lynching and the Law and 
Arthur Franklin Raper’s The Tragedy of Lynching, 44 YALE L. J. 191, 193 
(1934) [hereinafter Wechsler, Review]. 
11  Id.; Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward “Neutral Principles” in the 
Law: Selections From the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 854 (1993) [hereinafter Wechsler, Reminiscences]. 
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1935, Wechsler downplayed Herndon’s status as an African 
American male and emphasized the fact that he was a hero of 
labor, directly tapping into a surge in popular support for “labor’s 
rights” following the 1936 presidential election.12  At the same 
time, Wechsler re-characterized the normative basis of his client’s 
appeal, arguing that instead of helping blacks mount a “revolution” 
in Georgia he was in fact stabilizing majority rule, catering to 
conservative fears of radical politics in the 1930s.13  In both 
instances, Wechsler downplayed Herndon’s race and emphasized 
aspects of his case likely to appeal to whites, whether they 
identified with the Right or the Left. 
Neutrality, for Wechsler, was not simply a call for deciding 
cases in a particular manner that reinforced doctrinal consistency 
or upheld the “legal system’s legitimacy.”14  Neutrality also had 
strategic value.  Cognizant of the depths of racism in the United 
States, Wechsler used facially neutral legal arguments again and 
again to advance black interests in a manner that eluded charges of 
favoritism and avoided political backlash.  Often, this meant 
focusing on improving black access to the political process.  
Inspired by the mass politics of the International Labor Defense in 
the 1930s, Wechsler developed a strategic liberalism that used 
federal law to undermine insurrection statutes in 1937, weaken the 
white primary in 1941, and publicize black protest in 1964.15  
While constitutional theorists like John Hart Ely criticized 
Wechsler’s adherence to neutral principles on the grounds that they 
did “not by itself tell us anything appropriate about their content,” 
                                                 
12 Compare Brief for the Appellant, Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 
(1935)(No. 665) with Brief for the Appellant, Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 
(1937)(Nos. 474-475). Risa Goluboff discusses the rise of labor’s rights in RISA 
GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 30 (2007). 
13 Brief for the Appellant, Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (Nos. 474-
475).  For the radicalization of American politics in the 1930s, see WILLIAM E. 
LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940, 
183-4 (1963); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL: THE 
AGE OF ROOSEVELT, VOL. III (1961).  
14 Friedman, supra note 7, at 516; See also Sunstein, supra note 7; Greenawalt, 
supra note 7.  This article does not maintain that Friedman, Greenawalt, and 
Sunstein are wrong to assert that Wechsler possessed an interest in doctrinal 
consistency and legal legitimacy.  He did.  What this article suggests is that 
when it came to the question of advancing minority rights, Wechsler also 
believed that neutrality had strategic value. 
15 One claim of this article is that Wechsler represents a holdover of what 
Kenneth W. Mack terms the “mass politics” and “Marxist politics” of the 1930s.  
See Kenneth W. Mack, Law and Mass Politics in the Making of the Civil Rights 
Lawyer, 1931-1941, 93 J. AM. HIST. 37 (2006) [hereinafter Mack, Politics]; 
Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering in the Era Before Brown, 
115 YALE L.J. 256, 306-7 (2005) [hereinafter Mack, Rethinking]. The three 
cases are Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); United States v. Classic, 313 
U.S. 299 (1941); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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that was precisely why Wechsler endorsed them.16  In fact, in a 
manner that prefigured Ely’s own endorsement of political process 
theory, Wechsler pursued process-based approaches to civil rights 
reform precisely because they appeared more neutral than claims 
cast in terms of morality, racial justice, or fundamental rights.17
Taking Herbert Wechsler’s endorsement of neutral 
principles as a starting point, this article will examine Wechsler’s 
engagement with the “long” civil rights movement, showing how 
lessons that he learned from communists in the 1930s influenced 
his approach to civil rights lawyering and legal process in the 
1940s and beyond.18  It will build on Kenneth Mack’s argument 
that rights-based liberalism was not the only approach to civil 
rights reform in the post-World War I era, nor was legal process as 
unresponsive to civil rights as scholars like Akhil Amar contend.19  
In fact, while most scholars agree with Amar that legal process 
failed to come to “grips” with civil rights, Wechsler suggests the 
opposite is true.20  As the Warren Court’s activist approach in 
                                                 
16 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 55 (1980).  
17 Id. at 43-54.  That Ely did not see a link between Neutral Principles and his 
own process theory may have been due to the fact that Wechsler did not 
advertise the fact that there was a strategic component to his neutral principles 
argument.  As this article will show, however, Wechsler prefigured Ely’s focus 
on the “access” prong of political process theory.  For more on the access versus 
prejudice prongs, see Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political 
Process Theory 77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991) [hereinafter Klarman, Resistance].   
18 I borrow the term “long civil rights movement” from Jacquelyn Dowd Hall’s 
The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past, 91 J. OF AM. 
HIST. 5 (2005).   
19 Though not a communist or grassroots organizer, Wechsler endorsed an 
approach to reform that cast law in a supporting role to social movements, 
something that Mack identifies alternately as “mass politics” or “Marxist 
politics.”  See Mack, Politics, supra note 15, at 302-309; Mack, Rethinking, 
supra note 15, at 1, 26.   
20 For a sampling of prominent scholars who argue that legal process never fully 
came to terms with Brown or the civil rights movement, see Akhil Reed Amar, 
Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 703 (1989) (reviewing PAUL M. BATOR, ET 
AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
(1988)); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Historical and Critical 
Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at cxiii 
(1994);  HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 255; LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE 
CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 42 (1996); Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Mark 
V. Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public 
Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1979).  Michael J. 
Klarman is one of the few legal scholars to recognize the potential of political 
process thinking for civil rights.  Klarman, Resistance, supra note 17.  While 
some might argue that “political process” and “legal process” are not exactly the 
same, Ely’s sanction of Supreme Court intervention in order to improve 
minority “access” to the political process coincides closely with the emphasis 
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Brown faltered, Herbert Wechsler’s strategic version of legal 
process came to the rescue, directly aiding the direct action 
campaigns in Mississippi and Alabama in 1964 and 1965.  To 
explain how this happened, this article will proceed in four parts.  
Part II will show how Wechsler became interested in southern 
racism in the 1930s, argued for federal intervention in the South in 
1934, and developed an appreciation for the strategic deployment 
of neutrality while working for the International Labor Defense 
(ILD) on two separate appeals for Angelo Herndon in 1935 and 
1937.  Part III will show how Wechsler continued to advance 
minority interests in the 1940s, by focusing on increasing minority 
rights or voting access.  Part IV will discuss Neutral Principles and 
the events immediately leading up to Wechsler’s critique of Brown 
in 1959, showing how the negative treatment of black students in 
Little Rock, together with the Court’s muddled reasoning in 
desegregation suits from 1954 to 1959, informed his Neutral 
Principles address.  Part V will show how Wechsler put theory into 
practice in New York Times v. Sullivan in 1963, providing the 
Supreme Court with a more strategic, process-oriented angle for 
advancing black interests than the one advanced by the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 
Brown. 
 
 
II. DEFENDING COMMUNISTS: HERNDON’S CASE 
 
Born in New York City in 1909, Herbert Wechsler grew up 
far from black life in the American South.  His grandparents on 
both sides were Hungarian Jews.  His father practiced law in New 
York, and Wechsler himself spent his early life in the city, 
attending public schools and then City College before entering 
Columbia University Law School in 1928.  During his second year 
at Columbia, Wall Street suffered one of its most dramatic 
downturns in history, triggering a severe economic depression that 
would last for over a decade.21
One year into the Great Depression, Wechsler graduated, 
gained a teaching position at Columbia from 1931 to 1932 and 
then, after the 1932 spring semester, won a prestigious clerkship 
with former Columbia Law School Dean and Supreme Court 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone.  Stone, at the time, was one of 
Wechsler’s heroes.22  His tendency to side with realist justices 
                                                                                                                                                 
that legal process theorists placed on the institutional competency of courts vis a 
vis legislatures.  Laura Kalman even goes so far as to argue that Ely represented 
legal process theory “at its purest.”  Id. at 91.   
21 Wechsler, Reminiscences, supra note 11, at 53-58. 
22 Id. at 51. 
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Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis in favor of upholding 
state and federal business regulations against formalist notions of 
substantive due process impressed Wechsler, who possessed an 
“unqualified disdain” for the Court’s Lochner-era jurisprudence.23  
Wechsler viewed the conservatives on the Court, men like George 
Sutherland, Pierce Butler and James C. McReynolds to be 
undemocratic, meanwhile admiring Stone, Brandeis and Holmes 
for supporting progressive business regulations and Roosevelt’s 
ambitious New Deal.24
While Wechsler admired Stone for supporting the New 
Deal, he did not view him to be a champion of minority rights.25  
Though the Republican Justice would later become famous for 
suggesting that the Constitution be read to protect “discrete and 
insular minorities” in 1938, the parties most responsible for 
bringing questions of minority rights to national attention in 1932 
were communists.26  This became clear in 1931, when the 
Communist Party USA, the Young Communist League, and the 
Communist Party’s legal advocacy wing, the International Labor 
Defense, or ILD, took up the case of nine African American 
defendants falsely accused of raping two white women in 
Scottsboro, Alabama.27
The ILD won representation of the defendants over 
NAACP and waged a massive political campaign to raise 
awareness for the “Scottsboro boys.”28  Convinced that litigation 
alone would fail, the ILD advocated “mass action outside of courts 
and legislative bodies,” staging protests, rallies and demonstrations 
to free the nine black defendants.29  From 1931 to 1932, the ILD 
and its communist allies held mass demonstrations in Chicago and 
                                                 
23 Id. at 50. 
24 Id. Stone’s support of the New Deal was qualified.  He feared the manner in 
which Roosevelt accumulated power during the New Deal, even as he came to 
recognize the necessity of at least some degree of government control of private 
industry.  ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE 
LAW (1956), 371, 446, 544. 
25 Herbert Wechsler, Stone and the Constitution, 46 COL. L. REV. 764, 795 
(1946) [hereinafter Wechsler, Stone].  
26 DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969); 
GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, DEFYING DIXIE: THE RADICAL ROOTS OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS, 1919-1950 (2008); ROBIN D. G. KELLEY, HAMMER AND HOE: 
ALABAMA COMMUNISTS DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1990); CHARLES H. 
MARTIN, THE ANGELO HERNDON CASE AND SOUTHERN JUSTICE (1963); 
HARVARD SITKOFF, A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS: THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS AS A NATIONAL ISSUE, THE DEPRESSION DECADE (1978); PATRICIA 
SULLIVAN, DAYS OF HOPE: RACE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NEW DEAL ERA 
(1996). 
27 SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 146.  
28 CARTER, supra note 26, at 54-100; SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 87-88; 
(SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 146-47 (1978). 
29 SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 148; CARTER supra note 26, at 59, 141-3, 244. 
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New York, staged a mass rally in front of the White House, and 
even sent the mothers of the Scottsboro boys on a national tour.30   
Meanwhile, the ILD and the Communist Party churned out reams 
of propaganda in publications like The Daily Worker and New 
Masses, propaganda that, by 1932, bled into more mainstream 
publications like The Nation, the New Republic and the New York 
Times.31  By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, in the 
fall of 1932, figures as disparate as Albert Einstein, H.G. Wells, 
and Maxim Gorky were speaking out against the persecution of the 
nine defendants.32
In what appeared to be a direct response to the political 
pressure applied by the ILD, the Supreme Court intervened to help 
the Scottsboro boys.33  In November 1932, while Wechsler was 
clerking for Stone, otherwise conservative Justice George 
Sutherland reversed and remanded the convictions of the nine 
African American defendants, applying the Fourteenth 
Amendment to extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in 
death penalty cases to the states.34  Though Stone joined 
Sutherland’s opinion, Wechsler left his clerkship the following 
spring convinced not that his Justice had pioneered the struggle for 
racial equality, but that the ILD had.35
As the ILD returned to the Deep South to continue fighting 
for the Scottsboro boys, Wechsler brought a newfound concern for 
racial injustice with him North to Columbia.  In 1934, Wechsler 
came out in favor of federal anti-lynching legislation in the 
prominent Yale Law Journal.36  Lynching, a problem that had 
gradually been in decline in Dixie, spiked in 1930 and continued to 
rise through 1932 and 1933.37  This violence led to a surge in anti-
lynching activism as the NAACP pushed for the enactment of a 
federal anti-lynching bill and New Deal liberals like Will 
Alexander, then employed by the Roosevelt administration, formed 
a commission to study the problem.38
                                                 
30 SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 146; CARTER supra note 26, at 146-7, 248-251. 
31 SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 87-8; SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 146-147. 
32 SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 147.  
33 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). While it is impossible to know 
whether the ILD actually influenced the Court, the organization’s campaign did 
impress Wechsler. 
34 Id.  
35 Wechsler recalled Stone’s attitude towards minority rights to be one of 
relative “ambivalence” in the early 1930s, not truly congealing around the idea 
of protecting minority access to the political process until 1938.  This stood in 
marked contrast to the communist intervention on behalf of southern blacks in 
1931. Wechsler, Reminiscences, supra note 11, at 154. 
36 Wechsler, Review supra note 10, at 193. 
37 SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 244-5. 
38 SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 270-4; SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 24-5.  
Interestingly, one of the authors of the Costigan-Wagner Anti-lynching bill 
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In a review of two books on lynching sponsored by 
Alexander’s commission, Wechsler argued that “significant 
reconstruction” of the South was necessary and that federal 
legislation was “[f]ar more” likely to achieve reform than solutions 
sponsored by southern states.39  In fact, Wechsler strongly 
advocated federal judicial intervention in southern affairs, noting 
that federal prosecutors “answerable to Washington,” federal 
judges “enjoying life tenure” and federal jurors “drawn from a 
higher economic and social stratum” promised to be much more 
effective than “the southern legislator.”40  Further, if anyone 
regarded the question of race relations in the South “as local and 
unfit for federal action,” continued Wechsler, they should “reread 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”41
These were remarkable claims.  Not only did Wechsler 
express a considerable degree of support for federal intervention in 
the South, a position that contradicted his earlier anti-Lochner 
aversion to judicial intervention in state affairs, he even anticipated 
a second “reconstruction” of the region, something that would not 
come to fruition until the 1960s.  Further, Wechsler endorsed a 
bold reading of the Fourteenth Amendment in favor of racial 
minorities, something that the Supreme Court would not engage in 
until the 1950s.  Four years before his mentor Harlan Fiske Stone 
articulated a concern for discrete and insular minorities in footnote 
4 of Carolene Products,42 Wechsler articulated an express interest 
in using federal power to ameliorate the injustices suffered by 
southern blacks.  Not only did he see a need to stop lynching, he 
lamented “the political impotence” that black voters suffered under 
poll taxes, literacy tests, and other modes of disfranchisement.43  
He also derided the “unequal allocation of public funds devoted to 
educational purposes” several years before the Supreme Court 
would begin to consider such matters in Gaines v. Canada.44  
Further, Wechsler suggested that the government do more than 
simply enact voting laws, school equalization requirements and 
anti-lynching measures.  The “job of the government” noted 
Wechsler, was nothing less than “the creation of a more abundant 
life for the negro.”45
That Wechsler declared the government’s job to be 
improving black life was remarkable, particularly at a moment 
                                                                                                                                                 
turned out to be Columbia University Law Professor Karl Llewellyn, a colleague 
and former professor of Herbert Wechsler. SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 281. 
39 Wechsler, Review, supra note 10, at 193. 
40 Id.  
41 Id.  
42 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
43 Wechsler, Review, supra note 10, at 193. 
44 Id. at 191; State of Mo. ex rel .Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).  
45 Wechsler, Review supra note 10, at 191.  
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when southern segregationists seemed more determined than ever 
to retain white supremacy.  Nowhere was this more obvious than in 
the context of lynching.46  From 1934 to 1938, as lynching spiked 
in the South, the NAACP mounted campaigns to push the very 
anti-lynching bills that Wechsler endorsed through Congress, often 
publicizing gruesome details of southern lynchings to do so.47  To 
take just one example, only a few months before Wechsler’s Yale 
Law Journal piece went to press, the NAACP advertised the brutal 
murder of an African American named Claude Neal at the hands of 
a white mob in Northwest Florida.48   Neal, suspected of raping a 
white farmer’s daughter near Marianna, had been retrieved by a 
mob from a jail in neighboring Alabama and brought back to 
Florida only to have his fingers, toes, and genitals cut off before 
being hung from a tree outside the county courthouse.49 The 
NAACP produced a pamphlet describing the murder and 
distributed it nationally in an attempt to boost support for an anti-
lynching bill.50
Though the NAACP would continue to publicize southern 
atrocities through the 1930s, southern intransigence in the Senate 
foiled every attempt.51  This failure, caused in part by Senate rules 
allowing a minority of states to thwart majority will through 
procedural devices like the filibuster, convinced Wechsler that 
American federalism posed profound challenges to the 
advancement of black rights.  It also pushed him, later in his 
career, to argue that America’s federal system, thanks not only to 
the “filibuster” but also to “seniority” rules in the Senate, was well 
protected by political “safeguards” rendering southern concerns 
over federal domination redundant.52
Given that “political safeguards” written into the 
Constitution made national legislation on behalf of southern blacks 
difficult, Wechsler looked for other ways to ameliorate racism in 
Dixie.  Interestingly, he found one in the ILD.  Though no 
communist, Wechsler drew inspiration from the ILD’s 
commitment to grassroots protest and mass politics, even as he 
became inspired by the ILD’s tendency to frame racial injustice in 
ostensibly “neutral” terms that were unlikely to invoke a 
conservative backlash.  The core principle at stake in Powell v. 
Alabama, after all, was one that few could disagree with: indigent 
                                                 
46 Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition of the National Government, 54 COL. L. REV. 543 
(1954)[hereinafter Wechsler, Safeguards]. 
47 SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 277-88. 
48 Id. at 286. 
49 “They Done Me Wrong,” TIME, Nov. 5, 1934; SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 286.  
50 SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 286.  
51 Id. at 284, 287-88.  
52 Wechsler, Safeguards, supra note 46, at 548. 
 11
clients, regardless of color, deserved legal counsel before the state 
could put them to death.53
Largely because of his admiration for the ILD’s work in the 
Scottsboro case, Wechsler responded positively to ILD lawyer 
Carol Weiss King when she asked him for help on a case involving 
a black communist in Georgia.54   The communist, an African 
American named Angelo Herndon had been arrested by Georgia 
authorities in 1932 for possessing documents advocating a black-
led “revolution” in the Deep South; an act that led him to be 
charged with inciting insurrection.55  While Herndon’s charge 
rested on his possession of written material, a relatively innocuous 
act, authorities were aware that he had helped organize a 
demonstration of the unemployed in Atlanta only a month before, 
thereby evincing an arguably more militant show of commitment 
to social change.  Also, Herndon had been involved in communist 
organizing in neighboring Alabama for several years, and had even 
worked on the ILD’s campaign to free the Scottsboro nine.56
Hoping that Herndon’s case might become another 
Scottsboro, the ILD rushed to help Herndon in Georgia.57   
Unfortunately, the ILD’s trial attorneys met ironclad resistance at 
the state level, resulting in a sentence of eighteen to twenty years 
on a chain gang for Herndon.58  The penalty’s severity prompted 
Carol Weiss King to approach Wechsler through his colleague 
Walter Gellhorn at Columbia, in the hopes of mounting a more 
robust federal appeal.59   While Wechsler was eager to work on the 
case, he was not yet eligible to argue before the Supreme Court, a 
factor that led the ILD to recruit New York Republican and former 
Hoover official Whitney North Seymour, who Wechsler knew 
from Washington, to make the oral arguments.60
                                                 
53 Powell, 287 U.S. 45, 71. 
54 Charles Martin maintains that it was Walter Gellhorn, one of Wechsler’s 
colleagues, who approached him about representing Herndon.  This contradicts 
Wechsler’s memory of events. Wechsler recalls that Carol Weiss King contacted 
him, Gellhorn, and Jerome Michael at roughly the same time about aiding 
Herndon’s case.  Wechsler, Reminiscences, supra note 11, at 125; but see 
MARTIN, supra note 26, at 140. 
55 SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 150. 
56 MARTIN, supra note 26, at 10. 
57 Id. at 12-14.    
58 Id. at 61.  
59 Wechsler, Reminiscences, supra note 11, at 125. 
60 Also involved in the Herndon case from Columbia Law School was 
Wechsler’s colleague Walter Gellhorn.  According to some accounts, Carol 
Weiss King approached Gellhorn, who then approached Wechsler.  According 
to others, King approached Wechsler, Gellhorn, and Jerome Michael, who later 
bowed out due to his southern ties.  Wechsler’s account is that King contacted 
him and Gellhorn simultaneously, and that he and Gellhorn contacted Whitney 
North Seymour.  Wechsler Reminiscences, supra note 11, at 126.  Charles 
Martin suggests a slightly different version of events, based on Seymour’s 
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Herndon’s appeal proved to be a substantial commitment 
for Wechsler, one that lasted from 1934 to 1937.  It also proved to 
be an education on the intersection between federalism and black 
protest, forcing Wechsler to develop a theory of how the 
Fourteenth Amendment might be used to protect black activists 
like Herndon in the South.  Though only one of what would 
eventually become six lawyers on Herndon’s team, Wechsler later 
recalled writing the “bulk” of Herndon’s legal briefs himself, 
documents that, much like Wechsler’s 1934 Yale Law Journal 
piece, suggest a remarkable awareness of the black struggle in the 
South.61  For example, Wechsler’s first brief began with a legal 
history of slavery and Reconstruction in Georgia, showing how the 
colony abandoned its initial opposition to slavery in 1750, moved 
to increasing regulation of slaves and free blacks over the course of 
the eighteenth century, and eventually enacted its first anti-
insurrection statute in 1804 midst fears that “free Negroes,” 
“Spanish invaders,” and “hostile Indians,” might “arouse” the slave 
population “to insurrection.” 62  Never completely confident that its 
slaves were content, Georgia reinscribed its insurrection statute in 
1817, 1833, and 1861. Then, Georgia reenacted its statute to meet 
what Wechsler called the “special and unprecedented” dangers that 
Georgia faced following the Civil War, including fears that 
disgruntled ex-Confederates, or what he termed “die-hard 
secessionists,” “jayhawkers,” and “incipient Ku Kluxers,” might 
use physical violence to overthrow Georgia’s Republican 
government.63  “So great were the fears of disorder and 
insurrection,” argued Wechsler, that the Georgia Constitutional 
Convention recommended formation of a statewide police force 
while the state legislature passed the insurrection act that was used 
against Herndon.64
After completing his history of Georgia, Wechsler argued 
that the “dangers then facing the South” had “passed,” and that 
Herndon, who had organized at best “five or six actual members” 
of the communist party in Georgia, posed no actual threat to the 
state.65  In fact, Wechsler maintained that even though Herndon 
possessed documents calling for a black-led “revolution” in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
memory, which is that he enlisted Wechsler and Gellhorn to aid in him in 
preparing the briefs.  MARTIN, supra note 26, at 140-42.  
61 Atlanta attorneys Elbert P. Tuttle and William A. Sutherland also participated 
in the case, though Wechsler remembered them to be involved primarily in 
Herndon’s second appeal.  Brief for the Appellant, Herndon v. Georgia, 295 
U.S. 441 (1935) (No.  665). See also Wechsler, Reminiscences, supra note 11, at 
125-27. 
62 Brief for the Appellant, supra note 61, at 25-26. 
63 Id. at 25-36. 
64 Id. at 36-37. 
65 Id. at 38. 
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South, this word simply described “a new political or economic 
program” that did not involve the use of “force.”66  Once he 
established that Herndon did not envision using force to effect a 
black revolution in the South, Wechsler invoked Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s “clear and present danger” test to challenge the 
prevailing Supreme Court rule for determining when states could 
infringe on a citizen’s First Amendment rights.  That rule, 
established in 1925 by Gitlow v. New York,67 held that a 
defendant’s speech need not represent a “clear and present danger” 
to established government, but need only “tend to subvert or 
imperil” that government.68  This “bad tendency,” or “dangerous 
tendency” test, as it came to be known, meant that states did not 
have to measure when a defendant’s conduct would actually lead 
to revolt, if it ever did.69  “The State,” the Gitlow Court held, could 
not be required to measure the danger of every radical’s utterances 
“in the nice balance of a jeweler's scale,” but rather should seek to 
control all revolutionary rhetoric given that a “single revolutionary 
spark” could quickly “burst into a sweeping and destructive 
conflagration.”70
Though two decades of Supreme Court decisions were 
against him, Wechsler gambled that he could use the clear and 
present danger doctrine to create a more robust shield against state 
intrusions on black protest.71  Relying on an argument advanced by 
Harvard Law Professor Zachariah Chafee in 1919, Wechsler 
argued that in order for a jury to decide that Herndon posed a 
“clear and present danger” it would have to find that he posed an 
immediate, violent threat to the state.72   Anything else, he argued, 
would be an exercise in pure speculation, an attempt to “imagine” 
Herndon’s influence on “hypothetical communities.”73  This, in 
Wechsler’s opinion, was unreasonable.  “Due process,” he noted 
eloquently, “denies clairvoyance so major a role in determining 
liability.”74
Georgia disagreed.75  To it, clairvoyance was not the issue 
so much as common sense.  After all, Herndon had been found 
with literature advocating that land held by whites be “confiscated 
and turned over to the negroes.”76 Herndon had also been found 
                                                 
66 Id. at 52. 
67 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
68 Id. at 667. 
69 DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS, 284 (1997). 
70 Gitlow, 28 U.S. at 669.  
71 RABBAN supra note 69, at 323-24, 331-33  
72 Id. at 325.  
73 Brief for the Appellant, supra note 61, at 12.  
74 Id. 
75 Brief for the Appellee, supra note 61, at 7-9. 
76 Id. at 8. 
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with literature calling for the formation of a new independent 
“black belt” state in the Deep South where African Americans 
possessed the “complete right of self determination.”77  A more 
threatening proposal to white government in the South would be 
hard to imagine. 
And, according to Herbert Wechsler, blacks had ample 
tools at their disposal to effect revolutionary change.  These 
included “mass actions” and “demonstrations,” both of which the 
civil rights movement would eventually use in the 1960s.78  
Interested in creating constitutional room for radical black protest 
in the South, Wechsler’s argument thrust “the jeweler’s scale” onto 
Georgia authorities, forcing them to prove that black activists were 
actually on the verge of inciting violent rebellion.  Of course, this 
left the door wide open for activists like Herndon to organize 
demonstrations, strikes, and any other type of peaceful “mass 
action” that they saw fit in order to effect change, free from 
prosecution under Georgia’s insurrection statute.  That such 
organizing might lead to an “overthrow” of the government was 
irrelevant, so long as that overthrow was “peaceful.”79  Further, the 
fact that whites might resort to violence in order to stop the 
“revolution” was also irrelevant, so long as the demonstrators did 
not engage in violence themselves.80
Firmly embedded in Wechsler’s first brief on behalf of 
Angelo Herndon was nothing less than a constitutional strategy for 
protecting the process through which blacks would ultimately 
achieve reform in the South in the 1960s. Barred from voting, 
blacks still retained a variety of means for achieving reform, 
particularly if they did not fear prosecution for insurrection.81  By 
raising the state’s burden of proof on insurrection charges, 
Wechsler opened the door for more aggressive protest in Georgia, 
and arguably the rest of the South as well. 
The radical possibilities that went with allowing peaceful 
“insurrection” in the South alarmed more than just Georgia 
authorities.  In fact, Zachariah Chafee, Jr., the very constitutional 
theorist who had laid the foundations for Wechsler’s protective use 
of the clear and present danger standard, also came to fear the kind 
                                                 
77 Id. at 8-9. 
78 Brief for the Appellant, supra note 61,  at 54. 
79 Id. at *55-56. 
80 Id. 
81 One such means was labor organizing and unionism.  See e.g. GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, 
DEFYING DIXIE: THE RADICAL ROOTS OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 1919-1950, 69-78 (2008); ROBERT 
RODGERS KORSTAD, CIVIL RIGHTS UNIONISM: TOBACCO WORKERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
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KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
RACIAL EQUALITY, 117-120, 123-27, 131-33 (2004).  
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of revolution that Herndon in particular might spark.  Out of “all 
the chief sedition defendants” of the early twentieth century, noted 
Chafee, “all but one” seemed “harmless.”82  The only one that 
Chafee believed actually posed a “clear and present danger” to the 
state was Herndon.83 Like Wechsler, Chafee realized that African 
Americans in the South were not just ready for change, but 
possessed a variety of methods for effecting it.  Unlike Wechsler, 
however, who did not seem to think that such change would 
devolve into violence, Chafee feared that black revolution would 
lead quickly to a southern race war.84  “Smoking is alright,” 
warned Chafee in a veiled allusion to black protest, “but not in a 
powder magazine.”85
The Supreme Court, perhaps sharing some of Chafee’s 
concerns, proved reluctant to release Herndon.  In a procedural 
dodge, the Court rejected Herndon’s appeal on the technical 
ground that Herndon’s attorneys had not raised the constitutional 
challenge to Georgia’s insurrection statute successfully at trial.86  
Though technically correct, the Court ignored the fact that the 
Georgia appellate court had actually changed its interpretation of 
the insurrection statute after trial, raising issues regarding its 
constitutionality that Herndon’s trial attorneys could not possibly 
have anticipated.87
Angered by this clear avoidance of the constitutional 
question, Wechsler personally began digging through Georgia state 
law to find some alternate ground for carrying Herndon’s case 
forward.88  Interestingly, he discovered a Georgia law that kept 
state petitions of habeas corpus open in cases where questions 
concerning a statute’s constitutionality existed but had not been 
addressed at trial.89  Convinced that Herndon’s was such an 
instance, Wechsler drafted a habeas corpus petition and convinced 
Whitney North Seymour to continue with the suit.  Seymour 
agreed, re-enlisting two prominent Atlanta attorneys, William A. 
Sutherland and Elbert Tuttle, who argued the petition in Georgia 
and won at the trial level.90  Though the Georgia Supreme Court 
reversed, the United States Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s 
                                                 
82 ZACHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 397 (1954). 
83 Id. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935). 
87 Id.; Wechsler, Reminiscences, supra note 11, at, 128. 
88 Wechsler, Reminiscences, supra note 11, at 130. 
89 Id. at 130.  
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decision, overturning Herndon’s conviction under Georgia’s 
insurrection statute in April 1937.91
At first glance, Herndon’s sudden victory seemed to have 
had little to do with Wechsler’s brief-writing.  On the same day 
that Lowry came up for oral argument, President Roosevelt 
publicly announced a plan to pack the Court with a new justice for 
every judge on the bench who was over seventy.92  This “court-
packing plan” as it came to be known, sought to pressure the 
Justices into endorsing ambitious New Deal programs that pushed 
traditional boundaries of federal power.93  To many, the plan also 
pushed the Court to take a different view of cases brought by 
minority plaintiffs seeking civil rights like Angelo Herndon.94
Yet, Roosevelt never suggested that he wanted the Court to 
begin protecting black plaintiffs from southern racism.95  In fact, 
the President had refused to publicly endorse anti-lynching 
legislation precisely because he was worried about alienating the 
segregationist wing of the Democratic Party in the South.96  
Further, even if Roosevelt had secretly wanted the Court to assume 
the burden of protecting racial minorities in the South, there was 
little evidence that his Court packing plan would have that desired 
effect.97  Not only did the plan stumble in Congress, but it failed to 
muster substantial popular support nationally.98
A more careful study of the Court suggests that its shift 
towards Herndon had less to do with the court-packing plan than 
with the manner in which Herbert Wechsler recast Herndon’s case.  
Thanks to his own research, for example, Wechsler found a clear 
statutory basis for challenging the constitutionality of Georgia’s 
insurrection law, a move that Herndon’s initial attorneys had 
arguably failed to do.  For justices like Hughes and Roberts, who 
had expressed sympathy for minority clients and civil liberties in 
                                                 
91 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).  For a discussion of Lowry’s 
significance, see RABBAN, supra note 69, at 375; see also HARRY KALVEN, JR., 
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92 MARTIN, supra note 26, at 182.  
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the past, Wechsler’s work might have pushed them to decide in 
Herndon’s favor on the law alone.99
Another possible reason the Supreme Court might have 
taken a second look at Herndon is that Wechsler re-characterized 
his case in a manner that coincided with a surge in judicial support 
for “labor’s rights” following the 1936 presidential election.100  
For example, Wechsler lifted a discussion of the demonstration 
that Herndon had organized in Atlanta out of the footnotes and into 
the main text, making sure to note that Herndon had been 
demonstrating not just for blacks but for “unemployment relief” 
and “unemployment insurance” for all workers.101  Further, 
Wechsler made sure to note that while some of Herndon’s 
literature advocated the creation of a black state, a terrifying 
proposition to southern whites, the sum of Herndon’s material 
merely endorsed the “peaceful organization of the unemployed.”102  
Both modifications coincided with a surge in union membership 
and labor organizing following Roosevelt’s 1936 presidential 
victory, a political development that was accompanied by a spike 
in pro-labor decisions on the Supreme Court.103
In addition to Wechsler’s strategic revisions, another factor 
that may have contributed to Herndon’s victory in 1937 was the 
ILD.104  Just as it had with the Scottsboro boys, the ILD mounted a 
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campaign of demonstrations, propaganda and mass protest in favor 
of Herndon.  During the summer of 1935, for example, the ILD 
arranged for Herndon to tour the west coast, even building a cage 
like the ones used to house prisoners on Georgia chain gangs to 
accompany him.105  That October, the ILD held a mass 
demonstration in New York during which Herndon himself argued 
that the Supreme Court had denied his appeal not on legal 
deficiencies but in order to keep “white and Negro workers from 
organizing” in the Deep South.106  Herndon’s fusion of the black 
struggle in the Deep South with the struggle of labor generally cast 
his own case in a broader light, one that implicated the Supreme 
Court’s initial decision against him as part of a larger move to 
suppress labor and the New Deal.  Similar fusions of black civil 
rights and labor spiked from 1935 to 1937, as the ILD reached out 
to prominent organizations like the NAACP and the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), to build support for Herndon’s 
case.107
Even as the ILD worked to build a political coalition on the 
Left, Wechsler also added a twist to his argument that promised to 
appeal to the Right.  Citing De Jonge v. Oregon, a Supreme Court 
opinion issued in January 1937, Wechsler noted that it was 
“imperative108” that the government not crack down on political 
protestors like Herndon, precisely so that it could remain 
“responsive to the will of the people.”109  So long as the 
government remained responsive to the “people,” argued 
Wechsler, it would not alienate them, thereby ensuring that 
political reforms were pursued through “peaceful means.”110  This 
last claim was strategic.  By linking Herndon’s case to the 
preservation of order, Wechsler provided the Court with an 
opportunity to save Herndon on essentially conservative grounds, 
namely the absorption of radical politics into the mainstream 
political process.111   Wechsler also provided the Court with an 
                                                                                                                                                 
University. Id.  Herndon also addressed a crowd of over 20,000 people at 
Madison Square Garden in New York City in November 1936, denouncing 
racism in the South and fascism abroad. Fascism is Issue, Browder Contends, N. 
Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1936, p. 18.  See GILMORE, supra note 26, at 67-105, 112-
154. 
105 MARTIN, supra note 26, at 154.  
106 Herndon Cheered as Martyr by 2,000, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1935, p. 15. 
107 MACK, Mass Politics, supra note 16, at 44-46; SITKOFF, supra note 26, at 
148-89.  
108 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
109 Brief for the Appellant at *32, Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (Nos. 
474 and 475). 
110 Id. (citing DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)). 
111 At the time, this was a compelling argument given that radical politics 
seemed to be growing in the United States, leading some to fear assaults on 
private property and the political process.  David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt 
 19
opportunity to reinforce democracy in the South, transforming 
what was essentially a black minority claim into a defense of 
popular “will.”112
Evidence that Wechsler’s re-characterization of Herndon’s 
case did in fact influence the Supreme Court emerged in Justice 
Roberts’ decision, which coincided closely with Wechsler’s 
brief.113  Not only did Roberts blast Georgia’s insurrection statute 
for serving as a “dragnet which may enmesh anyone who agitates 
for change,” but Roberts sanctioned Wechsler’s notion that a ruling 
for Herndon was a ruling for the stability of the democratic process 
by citing DeJonge v. Oregon.114  Conversely, Georgia’s argument 
that agitators like Herndon might incite violent backlashes, a 
Cassandra-like prophecy given the manner in which civil rights 
gains would be won in the 1960s, emerged nowhere in Roberts’s 
opinion.115
Herndon, though couched as a victory for democracy and 
labor, represented a procedural win for blacks.  By undermining 
the criminal offense of insurrection, it widened avenues for African 
Americans in the Deep South to pursue grassroots organizing and 
reform.  Already, this was beginning to happen as communist 
organizers like Herndon were operating in Deep South states like 
Georgia, Louisiana and Alabama, at the same time that left leaning 
centers like the Highlander Folk School in Monteagle, Tennessee 
were beginning to educate black and white members of the 
working class.116
Though Congress confronted obstacles to providing direct 
aid to blacks in the South thanks to “political safeguards” like the 
senatorial filibuster, Wechsler realized that the Supreme Court 
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could ease the burden on political organizing at the grassroots 
level, increasing the possibility that change might come from 
below.  Interestingly, such thinking did in fact appear to influence 
the Supreme Court.  One year after Wechsler made his strategic 
appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone cited 
Herndon v. Lowry in a footnote suggesting that state measures 
which restricted the “political processes” necessary for protecting 
“minorities” deserved closer scrutiny.117
The footnote came in a case that challenged a federal 
statute prohibiting the sale of “filled” milk, meaning skimmed milk 
augmented by other ingredients to make it appear whole.118  While 
Justice Stone held that the federal law was a reasonable exercise of 
federal regulatory power, he reserved the right to apply more strict 
scrutiny to measures that were either “directed at” racial 
minorities, or impinged on the “political processes” ordinarily 
relied on to “bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.”119  
Because Stone cited Herndon v. Lowry in his footnote, Wechsler 
came to believe that the Court was moving down a path towards 
protecting minority involvement in the political process that he had 
helped pave.120  In fact, Wechsler later remembered Lowry to be 
“important” precisely because it established a “foundation” for 
how the First Amendment might be given “some meaning and 
teeth,” not simply as an abstract right, but as a vehicle for 
achieving “historical fidelity” to the initial “impulse” behind the 
Fourteenth Amendment.121  While Wechsler had repositioned 
Herndon as a hero of labor not race, he nevertheless retained his 
view that the Fourteenth Amendment’s initial “impulse” meant 
helping African Americans in the South, something that he had 
noted in his 1934 Yale Law Journal piece.122  In fact, Wechsler 
took Herndon to be part of what he called a “second revolution” in 
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American constitutional law, a restoration of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a tool for aiding the plight of African Americans in 
the United States.123
That Wechsler saw his work in Herndon v. Lowry to be part 
of the foundation for footnote 4 of Carolene Products is 
significant.  Among other things, it places him – along with his 
former mentor Harlan Fiske Stone – at the ground level of an 
approach to judicial review that would later become known as 
“process theory.”124  According to process theory’s most articulate 
proponent, constitutional scholar John Hart Ely, footnote 4 of 
Carolene Products provided nothing less than a justification for 
judicial review that existed independently of notions of 
fundamental rights or constitutional text.125  Predicated on the need 
for a functioning democracy, process theory took footnote 4’s 
second and third paragraphs and separated them into two separate 
prongs: the first sanctioning judicial intervention to guarantee 
access to the political process generally and the second sanctioning 
judicial intervention to bolster “those political processes” aimed at 
protecting “discrete and insular minorities” from majority 
prejudice.126
Though he predated Ely by a generation, Wechsler believed 
strongly that courts should reinforce minority access to the 
political process.  His work in Herndon v. Lowry, for example, 
aimed to protect black organizers and demonstrators in Georgia 
from being prosecuted for insurrection, a move predicated on an 
expansive notion that included political protest, not just voting.  To 
Wechsler, this expansive vision of the political process derived 
directly from the “mass politics” of the ILD in the 1930s, a politics 
that relied heavily on grassroots organizing and demonstration to 
build popular support for constitutional reform.127
Interestingly, even though Wechsler endorsed the “access” 
prong of footnote 4 he would never feel completely comfortable 
endorsing footnote 4’s “prejudice” prong, meaning the position 
that courts should intervene directly to protect minorities from 
majority abuse.  This too was linked to his civil rights work in the 
1930s.  Unlike later process theorists, Ely perhaps foremost among 
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them, Wechsler never believed that courts could go against 
majority will, even in extreme cases of flagrant abuse of 
minorities.  To him, judicial defiance of majority will invited 
retaliation, whether the kind embodied in Roosevelt’s court-
packing plan or more subtle forms like congressionally mandated 
“jurisdiction stripping” legislation.128  This was an element of 
Wechsler’s thinking that led him both to critique the Warren Court 
and to help guide it out of the political thicket in 1959.  Regardless 
of the Supreme Court’s perceived power, Wechsler remained 
convinced that it occupied a “subordinate” position in the 
American political process, a position that demanded judges move 
strategically on matters dealing with minority rights.129
Wechsler’s attention to the institutional competency of 
courts, particularly their subordinate relationship to the other 
political branches, made him a progenitor not just of process-based 
approaches to civil rights reform, but a larger school of thought 
known as “legal process” theory.130  Proponents of legal process, 
including scholars like Albert M. Sacks and Henry M. Hart, with 
whom Wechsler would co-write a legendary federal courts 
casebook, all believed that courts should proceed cautiously when 
entering areas of law that lent themselves to value-laden, policy-
style judgments.131  If they did enter such areas, legal process 
theorists like Henry Hart believed they needed to do so with 
“reasoned elaboration” of the constitutional principles upon which 
such action rested.132  Relying on sociological data, as extreme 
proponents of legal realism advocated, was not enough.133  Nor 
was a simple conviction that constitutional results be moral or fair.  
This adherence to legal formality, though often derided as 
conservative and reactionary by later proponents of Warren Court 
activism, aligned process theorists with early proponents of 
judicial restraint, men like Felix Frankfurter who rejected the 
Court’s ambitious invalidation of state and federal law during the 
Lochner era.134
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Frankfurter, like Stone, was one of Wechsler’s early 
heroes.135  His academic writings and legal opinions reinforced 
many of the lessons that Wechsler learned from the ILD, among 
them the notion that courts alone could not effect reform.136  
Frankfurter also impressed upon Wechsler the notion that courts 
could not withstand majority will for long, and should strive for 
process rather than rights-based reform.137
Frankfurter’s influence helps explain why Wechsler 
couched Angelo Herndon’s second appeal in terms of popular 
“will.”138  It also explains his interest in protecting minority 
protest; a device that he believed could be used, like the ILD 
believed it could, to influence majority opinion.  In fact, this 
explains Wechsler’s strategy, and success, in Herndon v. Lowry.  
In essence, Wechsler embraced a robust type of democratic mass 
politics, one in which minorities would be allowed, even 
encouraged to develop creative means of building popular support 
for their causes, even if it meant incurring violence.  This approach 
appealed to Wechsler for several reasons.  One, it helped 
minorities without making the Court appear biased towards them.  
Two, it promoted minority interests without ostensibly 
undermining majority rule, or established constitutional law.  
While Wechsler recognized that the Constitution sanctioned 
judicial review, for example, he also understood the potential 
unpopularity, even political backlash that courts might incur when 
they defied majority will.  Not only might court decisions be 
ignored, Wechsler recognized, but elected officials could pose a 
variety of threats to the Court’s autonomy.  President Roosevelt 
made this painfully clear in 1937 by threatening to increase the 
number of justices to bolster his New Deal programs.  Though 
Roosevelt’s court-packing plan failed to gain sufficient 
congressional support, Wechsler became interested in other ways 
that “legislators” might modify the “norms” governing judicial 
review, particularly stripping federal courts of their jurisdiction.139   
In fact, Wechsler wrote an entire chapter dealing with 
“congressional control of jurisdiction” in the federal courts 
casebook that he co-authored with Hart in 1953.140
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The rough and tumble constitutional politics of the 1930s 
convinced Herbert Wechsler that “in the end” all constitutional 
strategies for helping minorities in a democratic system had to be 
“utilitarian.”141  This meant that reformers had to think 
strategically about the type of constitutional arguments that they 
advanced, not to mention the manner in which those arguments 
were likely to be received by judges and voters.  “Votes,” believed 
Wechsler, were ultimately “determinative” in democratic systems, 
even when it came to the implementating judicial decisions.142
Though Wechsler sympathized with the notion that courts 
should protect the interests of “discrete and insular” minorities, 
particularly racial minorities, he did not think that courts could 
withstand majority pressure for long, as a matter of political 
reality.  Consequently, by the time that Wechsler’s old mentor 
Harlan Fiske Stone penned footnote 4 of Carolene Products in 
1938 his former law clerk had already begun to articulate strategic 
ways of protecting the process through which minorities might 
effect grassroots change.  In Herndon v. Lowry, Wechsler 
advanced creative expansions of the First Amendment to weaken 
insurrection laws, an age-old tool for crushing black protest in the 
South. 
Herndon v. Lowry did something else as well; it convinced 
Herbert Wechsler that augmenting litigation with mass politics, as 
the ILD sought to do through demonstrations and propaganda, 
could prepare the public for constitutional reform, even the 
invalidation of popular law.  By the time of Herndon’s second 
appeal, for example, Wechsler remembered that even “lots of 
people in Georgia were uncomfortable” with the fact that Herndon 
had received a “long sentence” but had not received “a hearing on 
the constitutional claims involved.”143  Had Wechsler worked for 
the NAACP, he might not have gained the same appreciation for 
merging litigation and mass politics.  Throughout the 1930s, many 
considered the ILD to be an even more “outspoken” defender of 
black rights than the NAACP, a position bolstered not only by its 
defense of Angelo Herndon, but its even more sensational defense 
of the Scottsboro nine.144  While the NAACP proved reluctant to 
mix litigation and protest, the ILD held mass demonstrations in 
favor of the Scottsboro boys in northern cities like New York, even 
as it mounted a vigorous legal defense, all the while maintaining 
that “confidence in the courts” alone could never bring 
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“justice.”145  For true reform to occur, in other words, the ILD 
believed that grassroots political activism, including mass 
demonstrations like those held in favor of the Scottsboro boys and 
Angelo Herndon, had to accompany judicial appeals. 
The ILD’s fusion of litigation and mass politics influenced 
Wechsler’s thinking on civil rights for the rest of his career.  Even 
through the 1950s and 1960s, he never abandoned the position that 
courts alone could not achieve social change, and that reform on 
behalf of minorities required at least some degree of majority 
support.  He also retained his interest in preserving minority access 
to the political process.  In fact, as the next section will show, 
Wechsler continued to pursue a process-based approach to 
advancing minority interests in the 1940s, setting the stage for his 
critique of Brown in 1959. 
 
 
III. UNITED STATES V. CLASSIC AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
 
Three years after Herbert Wechsler helped Angelo Herndon 
gain his freedom from a Georgia chain gang, he returned to the 
question of racial politics in the American South.  Yet, he did so in 
what could only be described as a racially neutral way.  In 
September 1940, a grand jury indicted four election commissioners 
in New Orleans for tampering with votes in a primary race for 
United States Congress.146  The indictment alleged that the 
election commissioners had violated the constitutional rights of 
United States citizens to have their votes counted pursuant to 
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution by conspiring to alter 
ballots and falsify vote counts.147
The citizens in question were all supporters of Paul H. 
Maloney and Jacob Young, two democrats challenging T. Hale 
Boggs for New Orleans’ congressional seat.148  Though not a case 
about race discrimination,149 the Democratic primary in Louisiana, 
like the Democratic primary in other southern states, essentially 
operated as a de facto election process from which blacks were 
barred.150  This meant that any decision successfully bringing 
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primary elections under federal supervision opened a doorway 
through which black claimants could use federal civil rights laws 
to gain access to the southern political process.151
Herbert Wechsler, who assumed a position as an assistant 
in the United States Solicitor General’s office in 1940, recognized 
the manner in which a victory for the plaintiffs in Classic could 
pave the way for black entry into the political process in the 
South.152  Though he did not volunteer to participate in Classic 
like he had in Herndon, Wechsler took Attorney General Robert H. 
Jackson’s request that he write the brief as an opportunity to 
expand minority access to the political process in the South.  Key 
to his argument was the notion that even though primary elections 
were essentially private affairs, run by political parties out from 
under the purview of state government, election commissioners in 
primary elections were nevertheless operating “under color of law” 
and therefore subject to prosecution under federal law.153
Standing in Wechsler’s way was a Supreme Court ruling 
decided in 1935 that held primary elections to essentially be 
“private” matters beyond the reach of federal supervision.154  This 
case, Grovey v. Townsend, involved the claim of an African 
American in Houston who had been denied the opportunity to vote 
in the state’s all-white primary.155  To distinguish Grovey from 
Classic, Wechsler argued that Texas had not made the primary 
“part of the electoral process” to the extent that Louisiana had.156 
For example, Louisiana had enacted legislation holding the state 
responsible for providing “ballots,” “stationery,” and all other 
“expenses necessary” to administer primary elections.157  
Louisiana had also enacted an elaborate scheme by which disputed 
primary results were resolved in state courts and the “form of the 
primary ballot,” the “location of polling places,” and the “hours of 
voting” were all established by the state.158  For all these reasons, 
Wechsler argued that the primary was an “integral” and 
“dispositive” part of the general election in Louisiana, and that 
private action interfering with that primary violated the right to 
“choose” under Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution.159   
Impressed by Wechsler’s mastery of Louisiana voting law, Justice 
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Stone relied heavily on his former clerk’s brief to decide that the 
election officials had in fact violated federal law.160
For civil rights lawyers like Thurgood Marshall, United 
States v. Classic represented a significant departure from Grovey v. 
Townsend, opening up the possibility that a frontal attack on the 
southern white primary might succeed.161  Yet, when Marshall 
asked Wechsler to join him in a direct attack on the all-white 
primary in Texas, Wechsler refused.162  Part of this refusal had to 
do with a conviction on Wechsler’s part that his participation in  
Marshall’s appeal might actually jeopardize the case by making his 
argument in Classic suddenly appear racially motivated.163  
Though it is impossible to tell whether this would have happened, 
Marshall went on to use Classic as one of his primary cases for 
challenging the all white Texas primary in Smith v. Allwright in 
1944.164  Marshall’s victory in Allwright marked a substantial 
advancement for black access to the political process in the South, 
a move closely in line with the “access” prong of footnote 4 of 
Carolene Products.165
United States v. Classic was not Wechsler’s only foray into 
the question of black access to the political process in the Deep 
South in the 1940s.  In 1943 Attorney General Francis Biddle 
asked him to put together a federal plan enabling servicemen 
stationed overseas to vote.166  To insure that members of the 
military could participate in national elections, Wechsler drafted a 
bill authorizing the War and Navy Departments to print ballots, 
distribute them, and then report the results back to voters’ home 
districts, ordering local registrars to count the votes.167  At the 
time, this involved what Wechsler remembered to be an “enormous 
dislocation” of state control over the franchise, a move that 
alarmed southern congressmen like Mississippi Representative 
John Rankin, who feared that the measure would form “an opening 
wedge” for Congress to begin “breaking down the 
disfranchisement of blacks.”168   Wechsler not only realized this 
was a possibility, but put in extra effort on the bill precisely in the 
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hopes that it would, one day, help African Americans in the 
South.169
In fact, Wechsler worked so hard that Rankin attacked him 
personally during a confirmation hearing in 1944, deriding him as 
“Weshler, who calls himself Wechsler,” in an attempt to impugn 
his character by implying that he was a Jew masquerading as a 
gentile.170  Though Wechsler was in fact Jewish, Rankin seemed 
blind to the fact that few members of Congress considered religion 
to be relevant to the question of whether one could serve as an 
effective Assistant Attorney General.  Yet, Rankin’s jab illustrated 
the manner in which Wechsler was himself reminded of the fact 
that he belonged to a minority; a reminder that only reinforced his 
awareness of the tenuous position that minorities generally held in 
the United States.  Indeed, Wechsler’s Judaism, though not 
something that he stressed in his professional career, helps explain 
his acute interest in how, precisely, the law might best be used to 
preserve minority rights against the often abusive power of 
majority rule.171
Wechsler’s attempts at improving black access to the 
political process in the American South in the 1940s both 
resonated with the lessons he learned in the 1930s, and came to 
inform his criticism of Brown in the 1950s.  As we shall see in the 
next section, one problem that Wechsler had with Brown was that 
it did not hinge on a process-based approach to achieving civil 
rights reform, but an equal protection claim rooted in the 
psychological harm that segregation caused black children.  While 
this claim would appear sympathetic to many in the North, 
Wechsler realized that it placed the Court in the difficult position 
of assessing “ad hoc” sociological results.172  As if that were not 
enough, the Court had also made itself responsible for altering the 
entire southern educational system, a job that it proved 
fundamentally incapable of doing without the help of black mass 
action. 
 
 
IV. NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND THE TROUBLE WITH BROWN 
 
The efforts that Herbert Wechsler made to expand black 
access to the political process in the 1930s and 1940s profoundly 
influenced his approach to Supreme Court decisions in the 1950s, 
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particularly decisions regarding race. Long attuned to the 
difficulties of achieving racial reform through litigation alone, 
Wechsler balked at a string of Supreme Court rulings from 1954 to 
1959 that boldly set out to invalidate racial segregation in the 
American South.  To Wechsler, these opinions lacked doctrinal 
consistency, defied popular opinion, and ignored many of the 
lessons that he had learned while an ILD-affiliated lawyer and 
federal official.  In fact, by the spring of 1959, Wechsler came to 
suspect that the Supreme Court was not only confusing 
constitutional law but impeding the black struggle in the South. 
At the heart of Wechsler’s concerns lay Brown v. Board of 
Education.173  Decided in May 1954, Brown marked the 
culmination of a determined struggle by the NAACP to win a 
Supreme Court ruling proclaiming southern segregated schools 
unconstitutional.174  Though the NAACP prevailed, it did so in a 
way that struck Wechsler as problematic.  For one, the NAACP did 
not rely on the type of “mass defense” politics that the ILD had 
once advocated in the 1930s.  Instead, it plowed into the sensitive, 
local issue of primary and secondary education with little 
grassroots organizing or support.  For another, the NAACP did not 
rely on the type of neutral legal argument that Wechsler had 
worked so hard to cobble together in Herndon, one that positioned 
minority interests in a manner that appeared to advance majority 
rights. 
“The problem for me,” noted Wechsler in April 1959, was 
“not that the Court had departed from its earlier decisions” or 
“disturbed the settled patterns of a portion of the country,” but that 
it had relied on faulty “reasoning.”175  One problem that Wechsler 
had with Brown’s reasoning was that the NAACP tailored its claim 
narrowly, arguing that public school segregation should be 
invalidated not because segregation was per se unconstitutional, 
but because segregated schools had “a detrimental effect upon 
[African American] children.”176  To prove this, the Court cited 
social science data assembled by sociologists like Kenneth B. 
Clark, who used a variety of innovative techniques, including the 
presentation of colored dolls to children, to prove that segregation 
“has a tendency to retard the educational and mental development 
of [African American youth.]”177
Though Wechsler sympathized with the NAACP’s ultimate 
goal of improving black life in the South, he worried about the 
NAACP’s use of social science evidence to do so.  Wechsler 
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believed that incorporating social science into law could be an 
effective tool for policy makers, even legislators, but was a risky 
proposition for courts.178  Courts, in his opinion, worked best when 
they relied on the “fixed ‘historical meaning’” of constitutional 
provisions, provisions that were “neutral” and therefore able to be 
applied equally to all parties at all times, no matter the immediate 
outcome.179  “A principled decision,” proclaimed Wechsler, rests 
on “reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend 
any immediate result that is involved.”180  Cases that evaluated 
sociological data, on the other hand, struck Wechsler as too 
focused on particular interests.  Not only did they presume an 
unconstrained “freedom” to “appraise” the pros and cons of 
“projected measures,” but if the projected measures in question 
were contingent on scientific findings, then the Court’s authority 
rested on it being knowledgeable in areas where it had, ironically, 
little knowledge.181
Driving Wechsler’s disapproval of sociological 
jurisprudence was the fact that the Supreme Court had a long and 
disreputable history of manipulating scientific data to arrive at 
undemocratic ends.  Much of its Lochner-era jurisprudence, for 
example, had hinged on questionable assessments of scientific 
evidence, including whether bakeries caused respiratory problems 
and whether women should be limited in the amount of hours that 
they could work.182  Though the Court presented its decisions in 
these cases as if they were based on objective fact, Wechsler 
understood them to be something else.   Its refusal to limit work 
hours in bakeries in New York, for example, struck him as a move 
against labor.183  Its agreement to limit work hours for women, 
conversely, struck him as a scientifically flimsy endorsement of 
then-existing gender norms.184
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Wechsler’s disapproval of Supreme Court justices 
pretending to be scientists applied to Brown as well.185  Though he 
sympathized with the result of the opinion, he feared that the 
Justices had gotten the sociology wrong.  Rather than ameliorate 
psychological harm, the South’s first experiments with public 
school integration during the 1957-1958 school year actually 
appeared to be exacerbating the damage to black students.  This 
became painfully obvious after nine black students integrated 
Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas.  The nine students 
gained admission to Central High from the local school board in 
1957 and received no indication that their entry to the school 
would be blocked.186  Yet, as the school year approached, 
Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus decided to turn the integration of 
Central High into a political issue, ordering the Arkansas National 
Guard to surround the school and refuse entry to the black 
teenagers.187  Claiming that he was afraid of white violence, 
Faubus kept the soldiers at Central High until federal courts 
intervened, ordering him to admit the students.188  At that point, 
Faubus dismissed the National Guard, allowing a white mob to 
terrorize the nine students as they entered the school.189  Press 
footage of mobs beating innocent black victims prompted 
President Eisenhower to intervene personally, ordering the 101st 
Airborne into Little Rock to defend the black teenagers, a position 
they would hold until the end of November, when they were finally 
dismissed.190
Almost immediately after federal forces left in November, 
harassment from white students against their black peers 
intensified.  In a celebrated instance in December, a white 
student’s insults prompted Minnie Jean Brown, one of the Little 
Rock nine, to lose her temper and dump “food on [a] white boy,” 
conduct for which she was promptly suspended.191  One month 
later, a white student named Darlene Holloway assaulted another 
one of the African American girls at the school.192  Holloway’s 
attack sparked a wave of attacks that lasted through the 1958 
spring semester as white students assaulted their black peers, 
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struck them with purses, kicked them, showered them with food, 
and intimidated them with signs encouraging them to leave.193  In 
one extreme case, a white student named Billy Ferguson even 
threw an African American girl down a flight of stairs. 194 
As day to day conditions for the African American students 
in Central High School worsened, Minnie Jean Brown left for New 
York.  Following her second suspension from Central High School 
in January 1958, Brown had received a scholarship to attend the 
private New Lincoln School on West 110th Street in New York 
City.195  Convinced that white harassment would only continue in 
Little Rock, Brown left Arkansas for New York in February.196  
Once there, she stayed with Kenneth Clark, the same social 
scientist whose evidence had been used to invalidate segregation, 
and was greeted by a representative of the Lincoln School and 
“fifty delegates of city youth councils and high schools in New 
York.”197
Brown’s escape from Arkansas, coupled with the continued 
harassment of the eight remaining black students that spring, all 
made it into the New York Times and presumably onto Herbert 
Wechsler’s breakfast table.  To him, the students’ trials raised the 
legitimate question of whether the NAACP had been correct in 
making the argument that integration would cure the harm to black 
children caused by segregation.  “Was [the Court] comparing the 
position of the [African American] child in a segregated school 
with his position in an integrated school where he was happily 
accepted and regarded by the whites,” wondered Wechsler, “or 
was [the Court] comparing his position under separation with that 
under integration where the whites were hostile to his presence and 
found ways to make their feelings known?”198  Wechsler’s 
mention of “hostile” whites was not something that the Supreme 
Court paid much attention to in 1954, yet it reflected the 
experience of the Little Rock nine perfectly.  It also went to one of 
the central constitutional questions of the case, namely whether 
integration provided a suitable remedy for the type of harm that the 
NAACP had articulated in Brown.199   “Only when the standing 
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law, decisional or statutory, provides a remedy,” argued Wechsler 
in 1959, “do courts have any business asking what the Constitution 
may require or forbid.”200  Though this position sounded 
unsympathetic to black rights, it was firmly grounded in 
constitutional law, going back to one of the central tenets of 
Marbury v. Madison in 1803.201
Wechsler’s interest in remedies helps explain his 
reservations about the NAACP’s decision to pitch its constitutional 
claim in terms of the psychological harm that segregation caused 
black children.  Rather than argue that segregation was per se 
unconstitutional because it denied whites and blacks the freedom 
to associate, for example, the NAACP decided to argue that 
segregation was unconstitutional because it disproportionately 
harmed black children in schools, thereby violating their right to 
equal protection under the law.  This was risky for several reasons.  
One, the NAACP underestimated the harm that integration would 
cause black children, as Little Rock revealed.  Two, the NAACP 
ignored a considerable amount of sociological research showing 
that what happened in Little Rock was actually to be expected, as 
integration tended to increase anxiety among minority students.202
Respected scholars like Allison Davis and Kurt Lewin of 
the Chicago School of Sociology, neither of whom had any vested 
interest in preserving Jim Crow in the South, both held that 
“proximity to the dominant group – not segregation – caused 
psychological conflict and personality damage.”203  If members of 
subordinate groups were successfully segregated from dominant 
groups, they argued, less psychological harm resulted.204  Though 
the NAACP omitted any mention of such findings in its Brown 
brief, the question of integration’s psychological impact continued 
to haunt the Supreme Court for the rest of the decade.  In 1958, the 
Little Rock School Board filed a petition before the Court 
explaining that the first year of integrated learning had been 
marked by “chaos, bedlam, and turmoil” in which there had been 
“repeated incidents of more or less serious violence directed 
against the Negro students.”205  Lamenting that the education of 
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the black students “had suffered,” something that anyone who read 
the New York Times probably already knew, the School Board 
asked for permission to postpone integration for another two 
years.206  Reluctant to grant Little Rock’s request, the Supreme 
Court suddenly found itself casting about for another rationale to 
justify desegregation besides the psychological harm that Jim 
Crow schools caused blacks.207  In Cooper v. Aaron, decided on 
September 29, 1958, the Court found one in the due process 
clause.208  Acknowledging that “the educational progress of all the 
students, white and colored . . . [had] suffered” under integration, 
the Court nevertheless asserted that “[t]he right of a student not to 
be segregated on racial grounds in schools is indeed so 
fundamental and pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of 
due process of law.”209
For scholars who had wondered about the validity of the 
Court’s reasoning in Brown, Cooper provided little relief.  The 
decision did little to explain how the right to attend a desegregated 
school had suddenly become “fundamental” on par with the right 
to have legal counsel in a death penalty proceeding.  The decision 
also failed to explain how due process, which generally protected 
individuals from having their life, liberty, and property taken 
without procedural safeguards, applied to segregated schools.  
While the Court had used the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to validate desegregation in Washington D.C., where 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply, it did not specify 
whether it was relying on the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment in 
Cooper, nor had it ever really explained how the Fifth Amendment 
applied in its D.C. decision, Bolling v. Sharpe.210
Wechsler found other problems with the Court’s 
desegregation rulings as well.  One such problem was that the 
Court “did not declare, as many wished that it had, that the 
fourteenth amendment forbids all racial lines in legislation,” but 
rather that segregation simply had “no place” in public 
education.211  This meant that segregation might have retained “a 
place” in other contexts – buses, parks, beaches, or golf courses – 
unless of course the NAACP could prove that segregating children 
in these contexts damaged them as well.  To Wechsler’s dismay, 
neither the NAACP nor the Supreme Court made any effort to 
establish that segregation in contexts other than schools did harm 
the psychological development of black youth.  Nor did the 
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NAACP or the Supreme Court articulate any other clearly defined 
constitutional principle for ending segregation in other sectors of 
southern life. 
Instead, whenever the Supreme Court did face the 
constitutionality of segregation in a particular context, it simply 
cited to Brown.  To take just a few examples, the Court used 
Brown to invalidate segregation in public golf courses in Holmes v. 
City of Atlanta in 1955.212  One year later, the Court used Brown to 
invalidate segregation on public buses in Gayle v. Browder.213  
Then, in 1958, the Court used Brown to invalidate segregation in 
public parks in New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. 
Detiege.214  Wechsler questioned the logic behind such rulings, 
which omitted substantive opinions in favor of per curiam rulings 
simply citing Brown.215  “That these cases present a weaker case 
against state segregation,” asserted Wechsler, “is not, of course, 
what I am saying.  I am saying that the question whether it is 
stronger, weaker, or of equal weight appears to me to call for 
principled decision.”216
Wechsler’s yearning for a principled decision might not 
have been so great had the Supreme Court enjoyed immediate 
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compliance with Brown and its progeny.  Unfortunately, however, 
the Court confronted sustained resistance in the South.  Only 
months after the ruling, grassroots opposition began to form in 
states like Mississippi.217  By 1956, state legislatures in six 
southern states embraced a legal program of interposition aimed at 
discrediting the Supreme Court.218  By the fall of 1957, 
interposition and grassroots opposition joined in a full-blown 
campaign of “massive resistance” against the Court.219
Though northern audiences recoiled at the violence in Little 
Rock, even they seemed ambivalent about integration when it 
came to their children’s well-being.220  This became obvious in 
New York City in October 1957 when white parents in Brooklyn 
resisted an attempt by the NAACP to have a school district in 
Bedford Stuyvesant, a predominantly black neighborhood, rezoned 
to incorporate white students.221  Part of the hesitation resulted 
from increasing violence at integrated schools in the Bedford-
Stuyvesant and Bushwick neighborhoods.  In November 1957, a 
special grand jury called to investigate violence in New York 
City’s public schools called for the assignment of police officers to 
patrol hallways after reports of fights between students during 
class time.222  In January 1958, the principal of John Marshall 
Junior High School, an integrated Brooklyn school that had 
become the site of increasing disorder, including the rape of a 
female student in the school’s basement, committed suicide by 
jumping off the roof of his apartment building before being 
scheduled to testify before a King’s County grand jury 
investigating school violence.223
Southern voices were quick to point to New York’s 
problems as a sign that integration was poor policy.  “I ‘would hate 
to think what the metropolitan press would have done to us,’” 
exclaimed Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus, “if the Brooklyn 
school violence had happened in Little Rock. .  . . [P]eople are not 
being told one tenth of the trouble about racial problems outside 
the South.”224  On February 5, 1958, Georgia Governor Herman 
Talmadge announced that the citizens of Georgia were “deeply 
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sympathetic with the citizens of Brooklyn in the difficulties they 
are experiencing in maintaining the independence and integrity of 
their public schools.”225  Talmadge even went so far as to suggest 
that “the President of the United States send Federal troops to 
Brooklyn to preserve order in the public schools there in the same 
manner that he did to force a new social order upon the public 
schools of Little Rock, Arkansas.”226
While Talmadge mocked, more serious figures chastised 
the Supreme Court for plowing into a hotly contested political 
question like segregated schools without adequate constitutional 
armor, arguing that its jurisdiction should be severely curtailed.  In 
January 1958, Learned Hand, one of the most respected Federal 
Circuit Judges in the United States, blasted the Supreme Court for 
overstepping its constitutional bounds, acting like a “third 
legislative chamber” and jeopardizing America’s democratic 
system of government.227  In his talk, Hand referenced a series of 
decisions – all handed down since 1950 – that invalidated 
popularly enacted law, including the segregation cases.  According 
to Hand, “nothing” in the Constitution explicitly granted the Court 
the power to invalidate Jim Crow laws in the South.228  The power 
of judicial review was not, as he put it, “a logical deduction from 
the structure of the Constitution,” but was instead a type of implied 
right, a “practical condition,” as he put it, necessary to preserve 
democratic government.229  To Hand, issues like public school 
segregation were not vital to national interests at all.230  In fact, he 
considered them to be little more than choices between “relative 
values” that the Court had no business deciding.231  Hand even 
accused the Supreme Court of making a “dubious” grab for 
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legislative power that did not “accord” with the “underlying 
presuppositions of popular government.”232
Others agreed, pushing for just the kind of congressionally 
mandated limits on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction that Wechsler 
had documented in his Federal Courts casebook.  One year before 
Hand delivered his lectures at Harvard, for example, Republican 
Senator William Jenner from Indiana introduced a bill restricting 
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in cases involving congressional 
investigations and domestic security issues.233  While domestic 
security measures and segregation laws had little in common, 
segregationists like Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland linked 
them, painting the Court as a left-leaning lobby, intent on catering 
to communists by abolishing national security measures and 
attempting to level American society.234  Interestingly, a former 
Supreme Court clerk named William H. Rehnquist penned a 
sensational expose in the U.S. News and World Report in 
December 1957 supporting this view.235  Rehnquist argued that 
left-leaning clerks slanted memos recommending certiorari in a 
way that threatened to influence their justices, pushing the Court to 
the left.236  While this claim drew obvious criticism, it reinforced 
conservative fears that the nation’s highest tribunal was returning 
to its power-hungry, Lochner-era days, albeit as a decidedly left-
wing “legislative chamber.”237
Though Wechsler too was alarmed at the Court’s “ad hoc” 
jurisprudence, his fear was not that the Court had gone too far 
down the road of liberal reform, but that it had gone down that 
road in an inappropriate manner, jeopardizing its own authority in 
the process.  In fact, Wechsler feared that if the Court did not 
modify its jurisprudence by making it more “neutral,” then right-
wing detractors like Eastland, Jenner and even Rehnquist would 
begin to chip away at the Court’s jurisdiction, compromising its 
already limited power.  “Only the maintenance and the 
improvement” of neutral standards of judicial review, argued 
Wechsler, will “protect the Court against the danger of the 
imputation of a bias favoring claims of one kind or another.”238  
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Even though Wechsler agreed that the Supreme Court’s power of 
judicial review was “grounded in the language of the 
Constitution,” he realized that there were limits to that power.239  
Consequently, in cases “where there is room for drawing lines that 
courts are not equipped to draw,” he argued, “I prefer to see the 
issues faced through legislation.”240
Wechsler’s interest in legislation reflected his longstanding 
belief that courts played a “subordinate” role in the democratic 
process, and should therefore refrain from overt declarations of 
minority rights lest some kind of backlash ensue.241  Indeed, this 
had arguably already begun to happen by the spring of 1959.   Not 
satisfied with massive resistance, states across the South had 
enacted a variety of measures aimed at preserving segregation 
through more subtle means.  These measures, the most popular of 
which were called “pupil placement” or “assignment” plans, 
removed any mention of race from southern state law but 
nevertheless allowed local school boards to assign students to 
schools based on factors linked indirectly to race.242  In 1958, after 
resistance to desegregation led President Eisenhower to send 
federal troops into Little Rock, Arkansas the Supreme Court 
declared interposition, and the political strategy of “massive 
resistance” that accompanied it, invalid.243  Yet, only two months 
later the Court declared Alabama’s pupil placement statute to be 
constitutional.244  Though framed in tentative terms, the court’s 
decision in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham could have been viewed 
not only as an “ad hoc” ruling, but one that sanctioned skillful 
white resistance.245  Suddenly, the Court appeared to be siding 
with southern states, against African Americans. 
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The Supreme Court’s shift towards the South in the fall of 
1958, coupled with increasing northern ambivalence regarding 
desegregation that winter, help explain Wechsler’s critique of the 
Supreme Court in April 1959.  If not dead, Brown certainly seemed 
to be dying.  Though massive resistance was in decline, southern 
states were shifting rapidly to newly sanctioned pupil placement 
and assignment plans, keeping integration rates firmly below one 
percent across most of the South.246  Meanwhile, legal giants like 
Learned Hand were joining southern segregationists like James O. 
Eastland in calling for restrictions on the Supreme Court’s power.  
To Wechsler, it was fast becoming imperative that the Court flee 
the political thicket and move “toward” a different type of 
constitutional jurisprudence, one that bolstered rather than 
antagonized black participation in the political process.247
Of course, Wechsler realized that the political process was 
not particularly conducive to civil rights either.  For example, he 
had long understood the difficulty of getting Congress to rise 
against southern state interests.248  The Senate, in particular, 
believed Wechsler, functioned “as the guardian of state interests,” 
a role supported by the “operation of seniority,” and the power of 
the “filibuster.”249  Yet, despite the tendency of southern senators 
to filibuster civil rights legislation, a Civil Rights Act had been 
enacted in 1957 and congressional hearings for another bill were 
underway in the spring of 1959, at the same time that Wechsler 
delivered his Harvard address.250  Thus, given the Supreme Court’s 
backpedaling on school segregation, it is not surprising that 
Wechsler felt there was more hope in the legislative realm than the 
courts. 
It is also possible that Wechsler continued to hope, as the 
ILD had once hoped, that grassroots protest would emerge and 
drive reform from below.  Already, one of the most successful 
stories of desegregation in the South in the 1950s came as a result 
of mass organizing and direct action.  From 1955 to 1956, a black 
led bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama pressured local officials 
into providing concessions to black riders on city buses, vaulting a 
young black minister named Martin Luther King, Jr. onto the 
national stage.251  While Wechsler lamented the Supreme Court’s 
handling of Gayle v. Browder, the case that came out of the 
boycott, New York papers like the Times followed the 
Montgomery protest closely, celebrating Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 
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role in the demonstrations.252  King’s own account of the 
movement, Stride Toward Freedom, became popular reading 
among intellectual elites in New York in 1958.  It emphasized non-
violent direct action, not litigation, as the most effective means of 
achieving social change.253  As New Yorkers began sending 
money to Montgomery, black ministers inspired by King and 
disheartened by southern attempts to gut the 1957 Civil Rights Act 
formed a mass protest organization called the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference, or SCLC, partly as a counterpoint to the 
more bureaucratic, litigation-oriented NAACP.254  In February 
1958, the SCLC mounted a grassroots effort to mobilize black 
voters in twenty-two southern cities, a move that became known as 
the Crusade for Citizenship.255
Wechsler’s critique of the NAACP’s strategy in Brown, 
coupled with his argument that the Court move “toward” a more 
neutral approach to aiding the movement, coincided uncannily 
with the movement’s own shift away from the NAACP’s litigation 
strategy and towards “mass action” in 1957 and 1958.  Indeed, 
northern coverage of the burgeoning grassroots campaign in the 
South helps explain Wechsler’s withering attack on Brown in April 
1959.  A veteran of the ILD’s mass politics campaigns of the 
1930s, Wechsler recognized that strategies were shifting in the 
South and that the time was ripe for the Court to adopt a more 
grassroots-friendly, process-based approach.256  Less than four 
months after his Neutral Principles address was published in the 
                                                 
252 See, e.g., Negroes’ Boycott Cripples Bus Line, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1956, at 
71; Alabama Indicts 115 in Negro Bus Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1956, at 
64; Negro Leaders Arrested in Alabama Bus Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 
1956, at 1; Wayne Phillips, Montgomery is Stage for a Tense Drama: Negroes 
Adopt a Policy of Passive Resistance to Segregation, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 
1956, at E6; Stanley Rowland Jr., 2,500 Here Hail Boycott Leader: Head of 
Montgomery Negro Bus Boycott Gets Hero’s Welcome in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 26, 1956, at 27; Montgomery Line Ends Seating Bias, N.Y. TIMES, April 
24, 1956, at 1; Stanley Rowland Jr., Boycott Leader to Preach Here: Dr. M.L. 
King of Montgomery Coming to Harlem, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1956, at 8; Bus 
Boycott’s End Voted by Negroes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1956, at 38.  
253 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY 
STORY (1958); Abel Plenn, The Cradle was Rocked; Stride Toward Freedom: 
The Montgomery Story. By Martin Luther King, Jr., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1958, 
at BR24 (reviewing MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM: THE 
MONTGOMERY STORY (1958)); Books – Authors, N.Y. Times, Sep. 15, 1958, at 
19 (reviewing MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM: THE 
MONTGOMERY STORY (1958)). 
254 MORRIS, supra note 116, at 82-86. 
255 Id. at 104-09. 
256 Montgomery was not the only site of grassroots organizing in the 1950s.  
Similar efforts emerged in Baton Rouge, Birmingham, Tallahassee, and New 
Orleans as well.  MORRIS, supra note 116, at 17-25, 63-73, 82.   
 42
Harvard Law Review, the opportunity to contribute to just such an 
approach fell in his lap. 
 
 
V. NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN AND THE PRESS IN THE 
SOUTH 
 
Herbert Wechsler was not the only proponent of racial 
equality who recognized that a new approach to civil rights reform 
was needed in 1959.  Three months after the Harvard Law Review 
published his Neutral Principles address, four black college 
students at North Carolina Agricultural & Technical College 
walked into an all white lunch counter in Greensboro and sat 
down.257  As news of their demonstration spread, black students in 
Nashville, Atlanta, Memphis, Richmond, Tallahassee, 
Montgomery and other southern cities followed suit.258
Interestingly, the student sit-ins of 1960 would provide 
Wechsler with an opportunity to rejoin the black struggle in the 
South, this time as a lawyer for the prestigious New York Times.  
The events that would link Wechsler to the Times began when 
black college students from Alabama State College engaged in a sit 
down strike at a white lunch counter near the Montgomery 
courthouse in 1960, prompting local officials to expel them from 
school. 259   Later that month, Martin Luther King, Jr. publicly 
endorsed the sit-ins, only to be arrested for lying on his state 
income tax returns, a trumped up charge aimed at undermining his 
leadership in Montgomery.260  Fearing King’s incarceration, a civil 
rights organization chaired by A. Philip Randolph, an icon of civil 
rights in the 1930s, decided to take out a full-page advertisement in 
the New York Times soliciting money for King’s legal defense.261  
The ad mentioned King’s incarceration and the expulsion of the 
student demonstrators, noting accurately that Alabama officials 
were attempting to “demoralize Negro Americans and weaken 
their will to struggle.”262
Yet, the advertisement got key facts wrong.  Instead of 
describing the sit-in as the cause of the students being expelled, the 
ad claimed that the students were arrested for singing “My 
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Country, Tis of Thee” on the capitol steps.263  The advertisement 
then went on to charge that Montgomery police, “armed with 
shotguns and tear-gas” surrounded the Alabama State College 
Campus and locked black demonstrators out of a dining hall “in an 
attempt to starve them into submission.”264  None of this was true.  
When Montgomery police commissioner L.B. Sullivan read the 
advertisement, he was so outraged that he filed suit in state court 
for libel.265  Though the advertisement did not mention Sullivan’s 
name once, Sullivan nevertheless charged that references made to 
Montgomery police discredited him personally, as commissioner in 
charge of police.266  While this was not a particularly robust claim, 
an all white jury quickly awarded him $500,000, a then-
astronomical sum.267  Stunned, the Times scrambled to mount an 
appeal in Alabama’s Supreme Court, even as more libel suits from 
Alabama officials started to roll in.268  Afraid that the paper might 
be sued into bankruptcy, Lewis Loeb, the lead attorney for the 
Times, called Herbert Wechsler.269
Wechsler immediately understood how libel suits could be 
used to thwart black protest in the Deep South.270  So long as 
southern officials could drag northern newspapers and television 
stations into court on libel charges, southern juries were likely to 
rule against them, whether they had committed libel or not.271  
This could have had a stifling effect on freedom of the press, 
essentially driving the northern press out of the South under fear of 
bankruptcy.272  Once the press was gone, northern audiences 
would no longer learn about racial abuses in the South, reducing 
the chance that they would continue to fund civil rights groups like 
the one supporting King, not to mention federal civil rights 
legislation.  For Wechsler, who had already suggested that federal 
legislation might be a more fruitful avenue of reform than the 
courts, the consequences for civil rights could be dire.273
Afraid that libel suits might choke the democratic process, 
Wechsler requested that the Times allow him to make an argument 
challenging “the accepted concepts about libel and the First 
Amendment.”274  Until then, libel law had been outside the realm 
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of the First Amendment, prompting anyone accused of libel to 
defend either on the basis that their claims were true, or that they 
constituted “fair comment” based on a reasonable interpretation of 
the facts.275  Though Wechsler initially agreed to argue that the 
Sullivan advertisement constituted fair comment, a negative ruling 
by the Alabama Supreme Court convinced him that southern courts 
would ignore facts simply so that they could use libel as a means 
of punishing the northern press.276   As “ten or twelve” additional 
libel suits were filed against the Times, raising the paper’s 
potential liability to “anywhere from ten to twenty million dollars” 
Wechsler lobbied for a more aggressive approach, attacking libel 
law generally as an infringement on freedom of the press.277
At first, the Times expressed “considerable resistance” to 
Wechsler’s idea.278  Never having lost a libel case before, the 
paper’s editors proved “reluctant” to “devote their prestige” to 
upsetting an entire field of law that had been expressly “developed 
for the protection of individual reputations.”279  But, in a meeting 
with the paper’s top editors, Wechsler convinced them of the 
“potential for abuse” that the Alabama verdict represented, both to 
the Times and to civil rights generally.280  After some debate, the 
paper’s editors agreed to let him argue their case before the 
Supreme Court, pushing not just for an invalidation of the 
Alabama court ruling, but a “progressive expansion of First 
Amendment protection” to the field of libel.281
It was a considerable victory for Wechsler, and well timed.  
During the spring of 1963, as Wechsler drafted his Supreme Court 
petition, the civil rights movement began to engage in some of its 
most dramatic protests yet.  Beginning in April 1963, 
demonstrators in Birmingham worked creatively to provoke 
violent reactions from local police, hoping to gain coverage in the 
national media.282  In May, movement strategists even sent 
hundreds of black school children into the streets to block traffic 
and stir disorder, pushing police to order fire-hoses and dogs 
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against the demonstrators, leading to some of the most dramatic 
photographs of southern brutality yet.283
By the time that Wechsler filed his brief in September 
1963, the role of the press in advancing civil rights was growing, a 
point that Wechsler emphasized to the Court.284  “This is not a 
time,” wrote Wechsler in his Sullivan brief, “to force the press to 
curtail its attention to the tensest issues that confront the 
country.”285  Allowing the northern press to remain in the South 
was necessary, he argued, to bring about “political and social 
changes” that were desired by the people.286  Of course, southern 
white people did not want political or social change, but that was 
precisely the point.  With northern media coverage, black people 
could gain the support of national audiences, tipping the scales 
against the white South.287
Yet, even as Wechsler understood the value of keeping 
northern media in the South, so too did he recognize that libel law 
had long been considered a state matter, beyond the reach of the 
First Amendment.288  This pushed him to make the claim that libel 
of public officials was not being used to protect private reputation 
so much as to quell “criticism of the government.”289  As such, it 
was akin to the doctrine of seditious libel, an unpopular offense 
enacted by Congress in the Sedition Act of 1798.290  Though the 
Sedition Act had expired by the end of the Adams administration, 
the Supreme Court had never formally ruled on its 
constitutionality, leaving the question open as to whether state or 
federal governments could punish seditious libel in the manner that 
Montgomery officials were trying to do in Sullivan.  Thus, by 
digging into American legal history, Wechsler found a principle 
for defending the Times that promised to help African Americans 
in the South yet was racially neutral. 
Impressed with Wechsler’s argument, the Supreme Court 
held unanimously in favor of the Times.291  Recognizing that the 
civil rights movement’s “existence and objectives are matters of 
the highest public interest,” Justice Brennan agreed with Wechsler 
that to allow libel actions like Sullivan’s to succeed would be to 
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“shackle the First Amendment.”292  Although the Supreme Court 
had ruled that the Constitution “does not protect libelous 
publications” in other contexts, Brennan followed Wechsler in 
distinguishing between private individuals and public officials, 
arguing that libel suits against public officials violated freedom of 
expression.293   In fact, Brennan even relied on some of the same 
quotes that Wechsler had used, noting that the First Amendment 
was designed to “assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas” 
necessary to bring about “political and social changes desired by 
the people.”294  Perhaps most remarkably, Brennan adopted 
Wechsler’s analogy between Sullivan’s suit and the Sedition Act 
of 1798.  “Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this 
Court,” wrote Justice Brennan, “the attack upon its validity has 
carried the day in the court of history.”295  Further, the judgment 
awarded to Sullivan in Alabama was “one hundred times greater 
than that provided by the Sedition Act.”296  This meant that if the 
Court allowed Sullivan’s victory to stand, a “pall of fear” would be 
cast over “those who would give voice to public criticism” to the 
point that the “First Amendment freedoms” could not “survive.”297
It was a remarkable victory for Herbert Wechsler.  Not only 
had the Court adopted his expanded definition of the First 
Amendment, but it effectively insulated northern newspapers and 
television stations from a barrage of southern libel suits that could 
have driven them from the South indefinitely.298  This would 
undeniably have impacted the success of the civil rights 
movement.  Already, movement activists in Mississippi were 
planning to bring northern volunteers down to the Deep South for 
“Freedom Summer,” hoping that they would raise national 
awareness of racial injustice there.299  Without the press, it is 
unlikely that this campaign would have garnered much attention.  
As it was, however, the deaths of three Freedom Summer 
volunteers, Michael Schwerner, James Chaney, and Andrew 
Goodman became national news, making headlines for weeks.300
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The presence of the northern press in the South played an 
even greater role in the civil rights movement one year later, 
during the opening months of 1965.  Beginning in January, the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference decided to target a 
small “inconspicuous” town in Alabama named Selma to build 
national support for a federal Voting Rights Act.301  Aware that 
local sheriff Jim Clark had developed an “impulsive” reputation 
for using violence against demonstrators, SCLC staff members 
planned a series of demonstrations to provoke Clark.302 On 
January 19, 1965, they achieved their first success when Clark 
assaulted black protester Amelia Boynton in front of the 
courthouse.303  On January 24, they achieved an even greater 
victory when fifty-three year old black demonstrator Annie Lee 
Cooper punched Clark in the face, prompting him to strike her 
repeatedly with his club.304  Though Cooper had provoked the 
attack, reporters for the New York Times and the Washington Post 
only photographed Clark’s response, sending a powerful image of 
segregationist brutality to the nation.305  Still more sensational 
images emerged on March 7, when 600 demonstrators marched 
across the Edmund Pettus Bridge only to be routed by a cohort of 
Clark’s deputies and state troopers who gassed, clubbed, and 
whipped the demonstrators back to the other side of the river.306  
Video footage of the brutality made it onto national television that 
night, while newspaper coverage exploded the following morning, 
alerting the nation to the brutality of southern racism.307
Though national support for black voting rights was 
relatively high prior to March 1965, and President Johnson had 
even begun efforts to draft voting rights legislation as early as 
December 1964, news coverage of segregationist violence in 
Selma greatly facilitated the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act.308  Not only did press coverage ensure that the bill would be 
enacted “with only minimal delay,” but it also ensured that there 
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would be no “weakening amendments.”309  In fact, newspaper and 
television coverage of the demonstrations produced a much more 
robust piece of legislation, making the federal government an 
active defender of black access to the southern political process.310  
Had Alabama officials like Clark been able to drive northern 
newspapers and television stations out of the South with 
astronomical libel suits, something Herbert Wechsler’s victory in 
New York Times v. Sullivan prevented, it is unlikely that the 1965 
Voting Rights Act would have been as strong as it was.311
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION: 
 
 
Herbert Wechsler’s victory in Sullivan was more than just a 
triumph for the First Amendment; it was a victory for the civil 
rights movement.  While scholars have tended to focus on the 
NAACP as the legal engine of the movement, at times debating the 
wisdom of its emphasis on school desegregation, a close look at 
Herbert Wechsler suggests that the NAACP was not alone in 
engineering constitutional reform in the 1950s and 60s.312  In fact, 
Wechsler suggests that civil rights strategies forged in the 1930s 
returned in the 1960s, with surprising results.  A veteran of the 
“mass defense” strategies of the International Labor Defense, 
Wechsler’s victory in Sullivan represented a very different 
approach to constitutional reform than the NAACP’s approach in 
Brown, an approach that incorporated grassroots protest, the 
media, and black access to the national political process.313 
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By forcing public officials to prove malice in libel suits, 
Sullivan helped keep the northern press in the Deep South, a move 
that directly facilitated the civil rights movement’s direct action 
campaigns in Mississippi in 1964 and Alabama in 1965.  Without 
press coverage of the demonstrations at Selma, scholars like David 
J. Garrow have shown, a “national consensus” might never have 
emerged in favor of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.314  This means 
that Wechsler’s campaign to rewrite libel law, though it did not 
address the question of black rights directly, facilitated the process 
through which the civil rights movement would ultimately effect 
change. 
Wechsler’s contribution to a process-based approach to 
reform, something the ILD stressed in the 1930s and that he 
encouraged in the 1940s, pushes us not only to reconsider civil 
rights lawyering in the 1960s, but legal liberalism generally at mid-
century. According to historian Laura Kalman, legal liberalism 
assumed two basic forms in the post-Brown era.  The first, 
“Warren Court activism,” stressed normative results over judicial 
craft and descended directly from the legal realist revolt against 
formalism led by progressive jurists in the 1920s, many of whom 
stressed the use of social science data as a guide for deciding 
cases.315  The second, “legal process” approach, also derived from 
legal realism but maintained that decisions based simply on social 
science undermined the authority of the judiciary and needed to be 
tempered with “reasoned elaboration” and an adherence to “neutral 
principles” of law.316
Though most scholars have tended to agree with Akhil 
Reed Amar that legal process theorists “never fully succeeded in 
coming to grips with” Brown, Wechsler’s strategic vision of how 
neutrality could be used to advance minority interests suggests a 
more nuanced story.317  Brown, to Wechsler, represented legal 
realism gone too far.318  Not only did it provide no clear, 
constitutional guideline for outlawing segregation in contexts other 
than schools, it was scientifically shaky.  Wechsler, an avid 
supporter of social science in the criminal law context, suspected 
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that the NAACP’s selection of scientific authorities was biased 
towards the results it wanted to achieve.319  Not only did the 
NAACP ignore prominent theorists who argued that racial 
integration damaged minority groups, they failed to anticipate the 
terror that black children would confront in majority white schools.  
By the spring of 1959, that terror had been carefully documented 
by the New York Times in almost day to day coverage of the 1957-
1958 school year in Little Rock, Arkansas.  Further, white parents 
in New York began to express ambivalence towards integration in 
1958 as black emigrants streamed into neighborhoods like 
Bedford-Stuyvesant and Bushwick, sparking interracial violence in 
public schools.  With no grassroots support and growing political 
opposition in America’s most cosmopolitan city, Brown seemed, 
by April 1959, to be on the ropes. 
With Warren Court activism flailing, legal process came, 
surprisingly, to the rescue.  Wechsler’s resurrection of the First 
Amendment in Sullivan in 1963 advanced black interests 
substantially by opening up a crucial avenue of the political 
process, the national press.  This process-based approach coincided 
closely with the rise of grassroots direct action protest in the South, 
protest led by civil rights groups like the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference, or SCLC.  As civil rights historians like 
Aldon Morris and David J. Garrow have shown, not only did the 
rise of the SCLC represent a distinctly different approach to reform 
than the “bureaucratic” court-centric approach pursued by the 
NAACP, but its approach, ultimately, carried the day.320  Through 
grassroots organizing, mass demonstration, and strategic handling 
of the media, civil rights leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr. were 
able to convince a majority of Americans that federal legislation 
was needed to truly effect a Second Reconstruction. 
Though Wechsler never belonged to any of the civil rights 
organizations of the 1960s, he was affiliated with one of the 
biggest civil rights organizations of the 1930s, the International 
Labor Defense.321  This suggests that the parallels between the 
legal process theory that he advocated and the manner in which he 
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approached questions of civil rights were more than just 
coincidental.  Precisely because Wechsler had been involved in the 
“mass defense” approach to reform in the 1930s, he understood 
how important it was for the civil rights movement to keep 
channels of the political process open in the 1960s. 
Rather than a development that failed the civil rights 
movement, Wechsler’s particular brand of strategic liberalism 
actually served the movement well by keeping lines of the political 
process, particularly the press, open to black activists in the Deep 
South.  While Sullivan was certainly not alone in aiding the civil 
rights movement, its emphasis on protecting the movement’s 
access to the political process places it in a different category from 
civil rights decisions like Brown v. Board of Education, which 
centered on more fundamental rights-based claims.322  For scholars 
who argue that Brown provided little more than a “hollow hope” to 
blacks, Sullivan provides another way of looking at law’s utility, 
reinforcing claims by historian Michael J. Klarman that a process-
based approach to reform might have provided more hope for real 
change.323  Indeed, even a cursory look at the movement’s gains 
appears to bear this out.  Not only did Sullivan contribute to the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, for example, but press coverage of 
black mass action set the stage for the return of the federal courts 
to the education context as well.  After a retreat from the question 
of segregated schools following Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham in 
1958, the federal courts did not move forcefully to strike down 
southern subterfuges in the education context until Judge John 
Minor Wisdom called for “liquidation” of de jure segregation in 
United States v. Jefferson County in 1966.324  Conceding that “the 
courts acting alone have failed,” Wisdom admitted that he would 
not have decided Jefferson County had it not been for the civil 
rights movement’s gains in 1964 and 1965.325  This means that the 
success of school integration in the South, to the extent it 
succeeded, might have been due more to the direct action protest of 
the civil rights movement than Brown. 
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Even if scholars like Gerald N. Rosenburg overstate 
Brown’s failings, it is still possible that historians have focused on 
the wrong decision when it comes to assessing the Supreme 
Court’s role in the civil rights movement.  To take just one 
example, Sullivan suggests that the Supreme Court in fact played 
an important, albeit supporting, role in the larger story of black 
mass action.326  This story of law’s interrelationship with mass 
action dates back to the 1930s and derives from a very different 
vision of how the courts can be used to effect social change.  
Herbert Wechsler, who predated John Hart Ely’s process theory by 
at least two decades, captured this vision during his sustained 
interaction with the long civil rights movement.327
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